Author Description

What makes an agent properly subject to moral expectations and evaluations? Why do they merit praise or blame for particular things they do? This important new book illuminates for the first time Aristotle's response to these central questions of ethics. The author shows that, contrary to those who think "moral responsibility" is a peculiarly modern notion, Aristotle's discussions of character and voluntariness address issues vital to the theory of moral responsibility. On this view, Aristotle develops a sophisticated theory capable of solving most of the problems any approach to moral responsibility must address. Meyer explains how this theory differs from many modern accounts: it holds that responsibility for character is not necessary for moral responsibility, and while it does not require that moral agency be an exception to the type of causation operating elsewhere, it is not vulnerable, she argues, to familiar anti-naturalist and incompatabilist criticisms. The causal notions to which Aristotle appeals allow him to articulate and defend the special causal status we assign to the moral agent without locating such agency outside the natural world.