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This authoritative report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This monograph analyzes historical campaigns through the lens of modern American military doctrine. Using the elements of operational art - particularly the concepts of operational reach, center of gravity, and risk - it compares the campaigns of Basil II against the Bulgars and Romanus IV against the Seljuk Turks. The study argues Romanus IV failed in his campaign against the Seljuk Turks by imprudently accepting unmitigated operational risk. This gamble led to his capture, the defeat of his army, and the subsequent collapse of the Byzantine Empire from invasion and civil war. In contrast, his predecessor Basil II cultivated his strategic, operational, and tactical capacities in Bulgaria which mitigated the risk of failure. By assuming mitigated risk to create an opportunity, Basil II defeated the Bulgarian field army while preserving his options to continue the campaign. These outcomes should prompt modern operational artists to deeply consider the risk inherent in Large-Scale Combat Operations in a world of reemerging great power competition.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Section 1 - Introduction * Elements of Doctrine * Literature review * The Byzantine Empire * Section 2 - The Campaigns of Basil II * Strategic Context * Operational Context * Tactical Context * Basil II's Bulgar Campaigns * Section 3 - The Campaigns of Romanus IV * Strategic Context * Operational Context * Tactical Context * Romanus IV's Seljuk Campaign * Section 4 - ConclusionIn an increasingly competitive world, the U.S. Army doctrine is developing from a counter-insurgency model towards Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations focuses the U.S. Army on setting conditions and winning in decisive battles. These battles are some of most chaotic, complex, and dangero