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Maintaining maritime dominance against near peer adversaries will tax an already complex logistics structure that depends upon freedom of movement to deliver critical materiel required to sustain operations. While the U.S. Navy is proficient in delivering fuel and other materiel via underway replenishment, it also depends heavily upon a network of airports and seaports. The Combat Logistics Force, operating from these facilities, carries this materiel and moves it the last tactical mile; however, the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) represents a critical vulnerability as it can only be reloaded while a ship is in port. Additionally, the Navy relies heavily upon access to port facilities that are often in range of potential adversaries possessing anti-access and area denial weaponry. Protecting this infrastructure and sustaining naval operations requires the cooperation of the other Services to provide air defense, force protection, and just-in-time delivery of munitions via inter-theater air transport. A review of naval operations in the 20th Century reveals operational insights and specific requirements for addressing MK 41 VLS replenishment in austere ports and anchorages. To minimize the burden on the Services for transportation and force protection and to gain increased agility in conducting prolonged combat operations at sea, the Navy should develop a balanced logistics and auxiliary tender force.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Hypothetical Vignette * Chapter 1: Problem Defined * Chapter 2: The Historical Context * Chapter 3: How China May Exploit This Vulnerability * Chapter 4: Implications For Joint Force * Chapter 5: Options To Improve Vls Reloading CapabilitiesThe Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) have the ability to overwhelm U.S. Navy (USN) carrier strike groups with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), causing surface comb