Author Description

As doctrine continues to evolve towards multi-domain battle, the homeland is under increasing risk. In the multi-domain extended battlefield, U.S. reliance on the defense industrial base and strategic lines of communication present adversaries with unique opportunities. At the same time, access to domestic critical infrastructure and key resources in the cyber domain could put the homeland in play in the next war. Efforts to protect the nation's infrastructure in the cyber domain currently remain largely focused on cyber-defense. What if a threat actor successfully penetrated cyber-defenses and impacted critical infrastructure? What would the defense response look like if this attack came during a major combat operation? Would such an attack be defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) or homeland defense (HD), and does it matter? This thesis explores these questions by analyzing the current DSCA doctrine and comparing it to current cyber threats.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION * Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure * Multi-Domain Battle Concept * Problem * Hypothesis * Primary Research Question * Assumptions * Definitions and Terms * Limitations * Delimitations * Conclusion * CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW * Introduction * Organization * Groups of Relevant Literature * Cyber-Warfare Theory * Policy * The Purpose of Army Doctrine * Previous Studies on Doctrinal Shortfalls * Current Threats * Summary * CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY * Introduction * The Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT) * Advantages * Disadvantages * Bias * Primary Research Question * Secondary Research Questions * Process * Application of SWIFT * Logic Model * Evaluation Criteria * Conclusion * CHAPTER 4 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS * Introduction * Hypothesis and Primary Research Question * Secondary Research Questions * SWIFT Process * Doctrinal Context * Modeling Doctrine * Thre