Author Description

For many years, the eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was used by North Vietnam as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and war materiels into South Vietnam and Cambodia. In addition to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. Operation LAM SON 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and helilift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test of Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The author, a General office in the Republic of Vietnam Army presents a critical analysis of all aspects of LAM SON 719 from the planning stage to the withdrawal from lower Laos.