Author Description

When the post-Mao leadership initiated economic reform in 1978, they set in motion a process which resulted in a fundamental redistribution of power within the Chinese party-state. Reducing central administrative economic control was a key component of the reform process. But although the decentralization of power to the provinces and producers was a deliberate central strategy, the resulting growth of provincial economic autonomy has surprised and angered even the architects of the decentralization reforms. China's reformist central leaders must take their share of the blame for the unexpected growth in provincial power in the 1980s. Their decision to adopt an incremental and reactive approach to reform may have been the most practical way of changing the economic system, but it never-the-less prepared the ground for provincial considerations gradually to overtake national concerns in local economic decision making. The resulting redistribution of power between centre and provinces has not only obstructed the attainment of some of the goals of reform, but also has important implications for the future trajectory of the Chinese political system.