On 27 February, a combined Dutch, British, Australian and U.S. task force put to sea from Surabaya, Java, with noair cover, in a last-ditch effort to attack a large Japanese invasion force heading for eastern Java in what became thelargest surface action since Jutland to that date. Under the command of Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, Commander,Combined Striking Force, embarked in the Dutch light cruiser HMNLS De Ruyter, the force consisted of the U.S. heavycruiser Houston, the largest, most capable ship in the Allied force, even with her after 8-inch gun turret destroyed byprevious bomb damage, the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter, the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth, the Dutch lightcruiser HNLMS Java, and nine destroyers—four American, three British, and two Dutch. Encountering a Japanese force oftwo heavy cruisers, two old light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, on paper it should have been at least a close match, with theAllied force having an advantage in light cruiser 6-inch gunfire. Unfortunately, courtesy of Japanese cruiser scout planeswhich constantly dogged the Allied force with impunity, that was never tested as the Japanese repeatedly outmaneuveredthe Allied force and were able to keep the laden troop and supply transports well away from the battle.At the time, it was believed by the U.S. Navy and most navies of the world, including Japan, that the state of gunnery firecontrol had become so advanced that it was expected that surface actions would be decided in minutes. The Battle of theJava Sea turned into an hours-long late afternoon/twilight long-range gunnery duel in which the Allies and the Japaneseboth squandered hundreds of rounds per ship with limited result. Houston emptied both her forward magazines, forcingSailors to manually move 260-pound shells from the after magazine under the unusable after turret, the length of the shipduring combat. Many accounts say Houston scored the first hit of the battle, on a Japanese heavy cruiser. Japanese reco