Author Description

The goal of the present project is to elaborate on proposals that could help promote transformation of the continuing state of mutual nuclear deterrence, foremost between the biggest nuclear powers — Russia and the United States — into a new mode of relationship based on mutual management of nuclear weapon (NW) interaction and impact on international security. Transformation of this kind, beginning in a bilateral format, will at some future point have to embrace multilateral strategic relations among the five principal nuclear powers and new nuclear weapon states (NWS), as well as some aspects of conventional forces development, deployment and employment. Even when dramatic changes take place in the political relations between nuclear states which make them stop seeing each other as adversaries, as with Russia and the United States after the Cold War was over, their armed forces, and foremost nuclear forces, retain the powerful momentum of confrontation and competition. These forces cannot adjust to new cooperative political relations on their own without well designed and consistent political and technical efforts on both sides. Furthermore, newly emerging adversaries, contingencies, and challenges brought about by nuclear proliferation and various conflicts of national interests, may destabilize strategic relations between the former enemies. The result can be increased tensions in their strategic policies with highly detrimental political, military, and legal arms control consequences. For example, the US decision of 2002 to test and deploy a strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, allegedly designed to defend the nation from the new countries (“rogue states”) possessing ballistic missiles, and Washington’s withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty made Russia place increased reliance on its offensive strategic nuclear forces (SNF). Thus, Moscow extended the service lives of its MIRVed heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)