Author Description

<p>Despite great strides in enforcement of the cartel prohibition of article 81 EC and major merger control reform, EC competition law still lacks clear modernised and effects-based standards for anti-competitive abuses under article 82 EC. In a masterful engagement with this issue, the thoughtful and original analysis in this book focuses on tying and bundling. Although these ubiquitous business practices are primarily addressed under article 82 EC as constituting abusive behavior, a wealth of economics literature emphasizes their strategic and efficiency motivations. However, there is a balance to be found, as this book ably demonstrates.</p><br/><p></p><br/><p>In the course of the analysis, the author zeroes in on such central questions as the following:</p><br/><p></p><br/><ul><br/><li>- What tests are available to determine whether two products are distinct or not?</li><br/><li>- Under which circumstances is anti-competitive leveraging feasible?</li><br/><li>- Which efficiency motivations should be accepted?</li><br/><li>- How does one valuate the possible efficiencies in the short run and the risk of leveraging effects in the long run?</li><br/><li>- What factors should be considered when answering the separate product issue?</li><br/><li>- What are the implications for the burden of proof under article 82 EC?</li><br/><li>- Should leveraging concerns due to tying and bundling be addressed under ex ante merger control or does scrutiny under article 82 EC suffice?</li><br/></ul><br/><p></p><br/><p>In his examination of the various responses to these probing questions, the author is able to formulate a very useful diagnosis of what factors determine whether a tied or bundled entity is likely to engender anti-competitive effects. The presentation is supported throughout by detailed reference to relevant legal-economic doctrine, laws, and judicial interpretation by European and U.S. courts, the European Commission, and antitrust agencies.</p><br/><p></p><br/><p>In