Author Description

Mathew Cooper's superb analysis of the association between Hitler, the German General Staff and with his generals sheds much new light on the reform of the Garman Army following WWI, Hitler's rapid increase of its power and strength on assuming leadership and on his conviction of brilliance on military matters, based on his early military successes in WWII. While the study covers the years from 1933 to Germany's surrender in 1945, most of the focus is on the situation during WWII, when Hitler's increasing interference with operational decisions and his growing distrust of his generals, particularly those from the traditional military classes and families. Such was the level of Hitler's intervention with battlefield decisions that Field Marshal Rundstedt, charged with halting the D-Day invasion, said that as commander-in-chief in the west his only authority " was to change the guard in front of my gate." A massive book and a wonderful insight into the leadership problems that confronted the German army in WWII. It will shake up the ideas of all those who regard the staff of the Nazi-dominated German Army as paragons of military competence.--The Economist