Author Description
Cover -- Constructing Practical Reasons -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1: What Is Constructivism? -- 1.1 The Basic Idea -- 1.2 Constructivism And Representation -- 1.3 Constructivism And Truth -- 1.4 Constructivism And Mind-dependence -- 1.5 Constructivism, Explanation, And The Grounding Relation -- 1.6 Putting Constructivism On The Map -- 1.7 Plan Of The Book -- 2: Reasoning And Reason Judgements -- 2.1 Preliminaries -- 2.1.1 The Reasoning Process -- 2.1.2 Practical Reasoning -- 2.2 Conditions Of Adequacy -- 2.3 The Normative Guidance Account 2.3.1 The Normative Judgement Condition -- 2.3.2 The Guiding Role -- 2.3.3 The Account's Adequacy -- 2.4 The Inadequacy Of Alternative Accounts -- 2.4.1 Pure Dispositionalism -- 2.4.2 Wedgwood's Account -- 2.4.3 The Treating Account -- 2.4.4 Reasoning And Rule-following -- 2.5 Reasoning And Conceptual Sophistication -- 2.6 Regress Worries -- 2.7 Metareasoning -- 3: The Nature Of Reason Judgements -- 3.1 Preliminaries -- 3.1.1 The Background: Functionalism -- 3.1.2 The Target: Representationalism -- 3.1.3 Representationalism And Directions Of Fit -- 3.2 Guidance And Representation 3.2.1 An Analogy -- 3.2.2 Why Not Both? -- 3.2.3 Enoch On The Deliberative Indispensability Of Normative Truths -- 3.2.4 Guidance, Truth, And Objectivity -- 3.3 Constructivism And Expressivism -- 3.3.1 Two Kinds Of Anti-representationalism -- 3.3.2 Expressivism As Conativist Anti-representationalism -- 3.4 Extending The Account -- 4: The Truth About Reasons -- 4.1 Constructivism, Correspondence, And Deflationism -- 4.2 Towards A Compatible Theory Of Truth -- 4.3 Wright On Truth -- 4.4 Alethic Pluralism -- 4.4.1 Some Problems Of Alethic Pluralism -- 4.4.2 The Two-level Approach 4.4.3 Distinguishing Domains Of Judgement -- 4.5 Truth And Sound Reasoning -- 4.5.1 From Superwarrant To Sound Reasoning -- 4.5.2 Avoiding Circularity -- 4.5.3 The Deliberative Constraint -- 4.6 Constructing Reasons -- 5: Correct Reasoning -- 5.1
Menrva's Summary
THE THESIS
This book investigates the core question of how practical reasons can be constructed through the process of reasoning rather than discovered as pre-existing normative truths. Andreas Müller, a scholar in moral philosophy, utilizes a framework rooted in functionalism and anti-representationalism to argue that normative judgements are grounded in the activity of reasoning itself. By examining the relationship between guidance, truth, and deliberation, the author provides a systematic account of how agents generate reasons through their own deliberative processes.
THE SCOPE MAP
What You Will Find
- A detailed analysis of constructivist theories in metaethics.
- A critique of alternative accounts including pure dispositionalism and representationalism.
- An exploration of the relationship between alethic pluralism and sound reasoning.
- A formal examination of the normative guidance account of practical reasoning.
Scope Limits
- The text focuses primarily on metaethical constructivism and does not provide a comprehensive survey of all normative ethical theories.
- The analysis is restricted to the philosophical mechanics of reasoning and does not address empirical psychological studies on human decision-making.
THE AUTHORITY PERSPECTIVE
Experts in metaethics recognize this work as a rigorous contribution to the constructivist literature, particularly for its detailed engagement with the mechanics of normative guidance. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in contemporary analytic philosophy to navigate effectively.
Page Count:
256
Publication Date:
2020-01-01
ISBN-10:
0191070955
ISBN-13:
9780191070952
Philosophy
Constructivism Philosophy
Metaethics
Ethics
Constructivism
Practical Reasoning
Epistemology
Practical reason