Author Description

Cover -- Constructing Practical Reasons -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1: What Is Constructivism? -- 1.1 The Basic Idea -- 1.2 Constructivism And Representation -- 1.3 Constructivism And Truth -- 1.4 Constructivism And Mind-dependence -- 1.5 Constructivism, Explanation, And The Grounding Relation -- 1.6 Putting Constructivism On The Map -- 1.7 Plan Of The Book -- 2: Reasoning And Reason Judgements -- 2.1 Preliminaries -- 2.1.1 The Reasoning Process -- 2.1.2 Practical Reasoning -- 2.2 Conditions Of Adequacy -- 2.3 The Normative Guidance Account 2.3.1 The Normative Judgement Condition -- 2.3.2 The Guiding Role -- 2.3.3 The Account's Adequacy -- 2.4 The Inadequacy Of Alternative Accounts -- 2.4.1 Pure Dispositionalism -- 2.4.2 Wedgwood's Account -- 2.4.3 The Treating Account -- 2.4.4 Reasoning And Rule-following -- 2.5 Reasoning And Conceptual Sophistication -- 2.6 Regress Worries -- 2.7 Metareasoning -- 3: The Nature Of Reason Judgements -- 3.1 Preliminaries -- 3.1.1 The Background: Functionalism -- 3.1.2 The Target: Representationalism -- 3.1.3 Representationalism And Directions Of Fit -- 3.2 Guidance And Representation 3.2.1 An Analogy -- 3.2.2 Why Not Both? -- 3.2.3 Enoch On The Deliberative Indispensability Of Normative Truths -- 3.2.4 Guidance, Truth, And Objectivity -- 3.3 Constructivism And Expressivism -- 3.3.1 Two Kinds Of Anti-representationalism -- 3.3.2 Expressivism As Conativist Anti-representationalism -- 3.4 Extending The Account -- 4: The Truth About Reasons -- 4.1 Constructivism, Correspondence, And Deflationism -- 4.2 Towards A Compatible Theory Of Truth -- 4.3 Wright On Truth -- 4.4 Alethic Pluralism -- 4.4.1 Some Problems Of Alethic Pluralism -- 4.4.2 The Two-level Approach 4.4.3 Distinguishing Domains Of Judgement -- 4.5 Truth And Sound Reasoning -- 4.5.1 From Superwarrant To Sound Reasoning -- 4.5.2 Avoiding Circularity -- 4.5.3 The Deliberative Constraint -- 4.6 Constructing Reasons -- 5: Correct Reasoning -- 5.1 Correct And Incorrect Reasoning -- 5.2 Correctness And Reasons -- 5.2.1 The Buck-passing Account Of Correct Reasoning -- 5.2.2 The Wrong Kind Of Reasons Problem -- 5.2.3 Correctness And The Possibility Of Compliance -- 5.3 Correctness Without Reasons -- 5.4 The Constitutive Rules Account Of Correct Reasoning -- 5.5 Developing The Account 5.5.1 Rules In General -- 5.5.2 Constitutive Vs Merely Regulative Rules -- 5.5.3 The Violability Of Constitutive Rules -- 5.5.4 Rules Of Reasoning And Reason Judgements -- 5.6 How To Determine The Rules Of Reasoning -- 5.6.1 Constructivism And Normative Theory -- 5.6.2 The Order Of Explanation And The Order Of Justification -- 5.6.3 Constructivism And Reflective Equilibrium -- 5.6.4 The Project Of Ultimate Justification -- 5.6.5 Reasoning, Shmeasoning? -- 5.7 The Status Of The Rules Of Reasoning -- 6: Mind-dependence And Objectivity -- 6.1 The Varieties Of Mind-dependence -- 6.1.1 What Facts? Andreas Müller. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.