Author Description

Cover -- Debating The A Priori -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Publisher's Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Analyticity Reconsidered -- 1 -- Belief, Apriority, And Indeterminacy -- Analyticity: Metaphysical Or Epistemological? -- The Metaphysical Concept -- The Epistemological Concept -- 2 -- 'two Dogmas' And The Rejection Of Frege-analyticity -- Skeptical Theses About Analyticity -- Non-factualism About Frege-analyticity -- The Error Thesis About Frege-analyticity -- 3 -- The Analyticity Of Logic -- The Classical View And Implicit Definition Implicit Definition And Non-factualism -- Implicit Definition And Conventionalism -- Quine Against Implicit Definition: Regress -- Quine Against Implicit Definition: Constitutive Truth -- Implicit Definition, Justification, And Entitlement -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 2: Blind Reasoning -- 1. The Question -- 2. Inferential Externalism -- 3. Inferential Internalism -- 4. Rational Insight -- 5. Rational Insight And Carrollian Circularity -- 6. Blind Yet Blameless Inference: Deflationary Options -- 7. Blind Yet Blameless Inference: Concept Constitution 8. Problems For The Meaning-entitlement Connection -- 9. Defective Concepts And Blameless Inference -- 10. Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 3: Understanding And Inference -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Logical Unorthodoxy And Concept Possession -- 3. Pejoratives And Conventional Implicature -- 4. Stipulated Possession Conditions -- 5. Conditional And Unconditional Concepts -- 6. Unique Characterizations And Unique Realizations -- 7. Logical Concepts -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 4: Williamson On The A Priori And The Analytic -- Notes Chapter 5: Reply To Boghossian On The A Priori And The Analytic -- Notes -- Chapter 6: Inferentialism And The Epistemology Of Logic: Reflections On Casalegno And Williamson -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- Notes -- Chapter 7: Boghossian And Casalegno On Understanding And Inference -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Using Logically Complex Sentences To Describe Visually Presented Scenes -- 3. Is Conjunction-elimination Enough? -- 4. Semantic Integration -- Notes -- Chapter 8: How Deep Is The Distinctionbetween A Priori And A Posteriori Knowledge? -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- Notes Chapter 9: Do We Have Reason To Doubt The Importance Of The Distinction Between A Priori And A Posteriori Knowledge?: A Reply To Williamson -- 1 -- The Resilience Of The A Priori -- A New Style Of Skepticism -- 2 -- A Problem For Characterizing 'experience' -- Discussion Of Williamson's Problem For Characterizing 'experience' -- Justifiers As Propositions -- Proof And Memory -- Resolving The Puzzle -- 3 -- Williamson's Central Argument -- Discussion Of Williamson's Central Argument -- Using The Imagination To Justify Belief In (2) -- Using The Imagination To Justify Belief In (1) -- 4 Paul Boghossian And Timothy Williamson. This Edition Also Issued In Print: 2020. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.