Author Description

The US Army and Marine Corps find themselves increasingly unable to fill combat-support and combat-service-support (CS/ CSS) positions in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. To compensate, the Joint Staff has tasked the Air Force to deploy significant numbers of Airmen from its agile combat support specialties "in lieu of" (ILO) the soldiers who normally fill these positions as prison guards and interrogators, convoy security elements, provincial reconstruction team members, and the like. Most reviews of the ILO program have focused on short-term execution-level concerns such as organizational relationships, equipment, and training, while completely bypassing the essential long-term strategic problem: while modern warfare places new and critical demands on combat-support forces, US military force structure in this area remains woefully inadequate. A variety of ad hoc measures-critically aided by valiant individual efforts-has progressively ameliorated these secondary problems, while at the same time creating a popular mythology that the fundamental structure of combat-support forces is, if not optimal, at least adequate and that the ILO program is a joint success. As a result of this myth, and in spite of continuing drains on operational effectiveness, combat readiness, and personnel retention, no one has yet offered a feasible alternative to the ILO program. This paper examines the question, How can the DOD and the services better organize, assign, source, and prepare forces for CS/CSS missions in the joint operations area? Specifically, it uses the security forces career field as a case study by which to assess the comprehensive effects of the ILO program in light of the evolving nature of warfare and the heightened importance of combat support. This paper finds that because the ILO program inflicts significant critical effects on the long-term health of the supporting- and hence supported-forces, continuing the ILO program as presently administered is