Author Description

Intro -- Cover -- Reasons, Justification, And Defeat -- Copyright -- Contents -- List Of Contributors -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. The Nature And Extent Of Defeat -- 1.2.1 Defeaters As Reasons -- 1.2.2 Defeaters As Reliable Processes -- 1.2.3 Defeat Scepticism -- 1.2.4 Higher-order Defeat -- 1.3. Kinds Of Defeaters -- 1.3.1 By Mechanism -- 1.3.2 By Normative Status -- 1.3.3 By Psychological Status -- 1.4. Summary Of The Volume -- References -- 2: The Normativity Of Knowledge And The Scope And Sources Of Defeat -- 2.1. -- 2.2. -- 2.3. -- 2.4. -- 2.5. -- 2.6. -- References 3: The Structure Of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, And Prospects For Reliabilism -- 3.1. -- 3.2. -- 3.3. -- 3.4. -- 3.5. -- References -- 4: Losing Knowledge By Thinking About Thinking -- 4.1. Justification And The Basis Of A Judgment -- 4.2. The Function Of Subjective Representations Of Basis -- 4.3. Defeat Cases, And Shifts Of Basis -- References -- 5: Dispositional Evaluations And Defeat -- 5.1. Success And Good Dispositions -- 5.2. Ways And Dispositions -- 5.3. Dispositional Evaluations -- 5.4. Putative Defeat And Dispositional Discrimination 5.5. A Better Feasible Disposition -- 5.6. Contrast With Instrumentalist Views -- 5.7. Conclusions -- References -- 6: Suspension, Higher-order Evidence, And Defeat -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Extremism, Moderation, And A New Third Way -- 6.2.1 Extremism And Moderation -- 6.2.2 Making Room For Moderation -- 6.3. Higher-order Evidence And Reasons To Suspend -- 6.3.1 When The Evidence Gives Out -- 6.3.2 The Nature Of Suspension And What It Tells Us About The Rational Profile Of Suspension -- 6.4. A Wondrous Resolution -- 6.5. The Substantive Options For A Finer Resolution -- 6.6. Conclusion 7: Reasons For Reliabilism -- 7.1. Two Approaches To Justification -- 7.2. The Classic Reliabilist Account Of Defeat -- 7.2.1 Why Reliabilists Need An Account Of Defeat -- 7.2.2 The Arp Account Of Defeat -- 7.3. Difficulties For Th