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Cover; Oxford Studies In Philosophy Of Religion: Volume 9; Copyright; Contents; Preface; List Of Contributors; 1: Privation In The Problem Of Evil: Impairment, Health, Well-being, And A Case Of Humans And Betazoids; 1. Introduction; 2. The Test Case: Betazoids And Humans; 3. Definitions: Disability, Impairment, And Health; 4. A Solution To The Puzzle; 5. Privative Evils And Theodicy; 6. A Confusion?; 7. Where Are We Now?; Bibliography; 2: What If God Makes Hard Choices?; 1. Swinburne's Model; 2. A Challenge To Swinburne's Model; 3. A New Model; 4. An Advantage; 5. A Disadvantage 3: Theism, Pro-theism, Hasker, And Gratuitous Evil1. Stage-setting; 2. Restrictions On God's Permission Of Evil; 3. Hasker's Case Against (1); 4. Must Gratuitous Evil Occur, Or Must It Merely Be Permitted?; 5. Criticisms Of Hasker's Argument; 5.1 The Strategy Is Self-defeating; 5.2 The Account Of God's Plan For Creation In (e) Is Mistaken; 5.3 If God Were To Prevent All Gratuitous Evil, We Would Neither Know Nor Reasonably Believe That God Had Done So; 5.4 Our Moral Motivations Would Not Be Undermined; 6. Conclusion; Appendix: The Argument From Excessive Gratuitous Evil; References 4: God And Gratuitous Evil: A Response To Klaas Kraay1. Preliminaries; 2. The Nge Defense; 3. The Problem Of Moral Motivation; 4. The Problem Of Excessive Gratuitous Evil; 5. Conclusion; 5: Moral Indulgences: When Offsetting Is Wrong; 0. Introduction; 1. Moral Indulgence; 2. The Moral Status Of Moral Indulgence; 2.1 Two Desiderata And What Can't Meet Them; 2.2 Universalizability And The Second Desideratum; 2.3 Application Of Universalizability And The First Desideratum; 2.4 Cause-matching; 3. Divine Indulgence; 3.1 Background Assumptions; 3.2 Divine Indulgence 3.3 Universalizability And Divergence On The Divine4. Closing Thoughts; Bibliography; 6: Time Of Trial; Time Of Trial; 7: Why Did The One Not Remain Within Itself?; I. Introduction; Ii. A Framework For Our Inquiry; Iii. Why Did God Create?; Iv. Could God Have Had Any Completely Adequate But Non-coercive Reason To Create?; V. The Solution To The Aporia Of Contingent Creation; Vi. The Need For A Further Traditional Resource; Vii. Need The Weights Of Various Reasons Add For The Problem To Arise?; Viii. The Way Forward; Ix. The Transfinite Alternative X. Cantor On The Transfinite And The Absolutexi. The Aporia Resolved; Xii. The Upshot For Theology; Xiii. An Inventory Of Kinds Of Normative Reasons; Xiv. Immediate Elimination Of Four Kinds Of Normative Reasons; Xv. Did God Create Out Of Reasons Of Personal Attachment?; Xvi. Creating From Reasons Of Love; Xvii. Did Generosity Provide God With Reason To Create?; Xviii. There Could Not Be Melioristic Reasons To Create; Xix. Ameliorism; Xx. To Show Forth His Goodness; Xxi. Manifestationism; Xxii. How Mistaken We Have Been About What Matters Edited By Lara Buchak, And Dean W. Zimmerman, Co-editor For Volume 9, Philip Swenson. This Edition Also Issued In Print: 2019. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.