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Cover -- What Is, And What Is In Itself: A Systematic Ontology -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction And Overview -- 1: Actuality -- 1.1 What Is Actualism? -- 1.2 The Indexical Theory Of Actuality -- 1.3 Critique Of The Indexical Theory -- 1.4 Actualism And Possible Worlds -- 2: Existence -- 2.1 Existence And Essence -- 2.2 Continuing Or Ceasing To Exist -- 2.3 Things There Are That Never Exist -- 3: Intentional Objects, Existent And Nonexistent -- 3.1 What Are Intentional Objects? -- 3.2 Extreme Realism About Nonexistent Objects 3.3 Moderate Realism About Nonexistent Objects -- 3.4 Anti-realism About Nonexistent Objects -- 4: Things And Properties -- 4.1 Reification -- 4.2 What Does Quantification Require? -- 4.2.1 Entity Without Identity? -- 4.2.2 Identity Without Entity? -- 4.3 Subjects And Properties -- 4.3.1 Properties -- 4.3.2 Properties As Universals And As Particulars -- 4.3.3 Ontological Subjects -- 4.3.4 Substance? -- 5: Intrinsic Reality, Relationality, And Consciousness -- 5.1 Real Properties -- 5.2 Intrinsic Reality -- 5.3 Consciousness: Our Surest Example Of Intrinsic Reality 5.4 Intrinsic Reality And Mental Acts -- 5.4.1 Understanding And Judgment -- 5.4.2 Intending And Trying -- 5.5 Intrinsic Reality And Relations -- 5.5.1 Part-whole Relations -- 5.5.2 Relations Of Cause And Effect -- 5.5.3 Potentialities -- 6: Reality And The Physical -- 6.1 Modernism -- 6.2 Physical Realism -- 6.3 Idealism -- 6.4 Panpsychism -- 6.4.1 Panpsychism Proposed As A Solution For Two Problems -- 6.4.2 Physicalism And The Combination Problem -- 6.4.3 Panpsychism Without The Combination Problem -- 6.4.4 Conclusion -- 7: The Epistemology Of Being -- 7.1 Problems For Empiricist Epistemology 7.2 Leibniz On Distinguishing Real From Imaginary Phenomena -- 7.3 An Empirical Sufficient Condition For Knowledge Of Bodies -- 7.4 The Modal Status Of The Sufficient Condition -- 7.4.1 Actuality And Incompleteness -- 7.4.2 The Nature Of The Sufficiency -- 7.5 Practical Reason And Ontological Belief -- 8: Thisness -- 8.1 Thisness And Suchness -- 8.2 Issues About The Identity Of Indiscernibles -- 8.3 Counter-examples And Intuitions -- 8.4 Thisness And Intrinsic Reality -- 8.4.1 Thisness And Things In Themselves -- 8.4.2 Thisness And Things That Are Not Things In Themselves 8.5 The World And I: Thisness In Empirical Epistemology -- 9: Identity, Time, And Self -- 9.1 Identity Without Distance -- 9.2 Experience And Time -- 9.3 Identity, Persons, And Metaphysics -- 9.4 Life After Death -- 9.4.1 A Toy Model -- 9.4.2 The Body -- 9.4.3 The Soul -- 9.5 Primitive Trans-world Identity? -- 10: God And The Causal Unity Of The World -- 10.1 The Problem Of Intrinsically Real Causal Relations -- 10.2 Occasionalism -- 10.2.1 How Does Occasional Causation Work? -- 10.2.2 Deterministic And Indeterministic Occasionalism -- 10.3 Panentheism Robert Merrihew Adams. Description Based Upon Print Version Of Record. 10.3.1 Is God A Subject Of Our Conscious Experiences? Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.