Northern Ireland's peace agreement, which put an end to IRA aggression, has been widely admired as a stellar model of conflict resolution. It is believed that Britain avoided rigid preconditions in its meeting with the IRA, a move that encouraged other governments to seek similar sit-downs with extremist groups. Whether in Spain, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, or Iraq, many now believe that intelligence agencies should follow the lessons of Ulster in their efforts at brokering peace. Yet two difficult questions remain: has history provided us with a clear picture of Northern Ireland's peace process, and does the "talking cure" work with all democracies? The authors of this volume not only present an unbiased history of Northern Ireland's transition from aggression to peace, but they also demonstrate how these events developed quite differently than many proponents of the Northern Ireland model believe. Through their expert research, they then contrast their findings against incidents in Spain's Basque country during the same period. The authors point to a range of variables at play in the Ulster negotiations, such as the selection of state representatives, the information provided by intelligence agencies, the wielding of hard power, and the wider democratic process. Above all, they draw a line between talking to terrorists who believe their strategy is succeeding and making overtures to those who realize their aims are no longer attainable through violent means. At a time when Ulster is experiencing a resurgence in violence, "Talking to Terrorists" offers a vital reassessment of the basis on which peace was initially established.