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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1898 edition. Excerpt:... into it as a " third" by replying to the advances made by France for our friendship. We shall appear relatively weak in every alliance with other great Powers until we are stronger than we now are. Austria and England, if we are leagued with them, will also not make their superiority felt exactly in our interest--that we experienced to our detriment at the Vienna congress. Austria grudges us any consideration in Germany, England any chances of maritime development in commerce or fleet, and she is envious of our industry. 'You draw a parallel between me and Haugwitz and the "defensive policy" of his time. The conditions, however, were different in those days. France was already in possession of the most menacing predominance, a notori ously dangerous conqueror being at its head, and England on the other hand might safely be reckoned on. I have the courage not to blame the peace of Basle; it was as impossible to make a lasting alliance with the Austria of that day and its Thugut, Lehrbach, and Cobenzl as it is now, and I cannot make the peace of Basle responsible for the fact that we came off badly in 1815; the reason was that we could not maintain our ground against the opposed interests of England and Austria because our physical weakness compared to the other great Powers inspired no fear. The states of the Rhine Confederation had their Basle quite differently to us, and yet they came off exceedingly well at Vienna. It was, however, egregious stupidity on our part, in 1805, not to seize the opportunity to aid in breaking up the predominance of France; we ought to have made war upon Napoleon swiftly, vigorously, and to the last breath. To sit still was even more foolish than to take sides for France herself; but after we had let that...