Author Description

Syria's devolution into civil war over the last five years has left that country devastated. The conditions there raise several questions about the causes of pronounced socioeconomic stratification between the political elite and the average citizen, which steadily worsened after President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 and eventually resulted in a civil war. This study asserts that the Assad regime's implementation of a wide range of liberal economic reforms, under the guidance of the IMF, ultimately contributed to instability in three main ways. First, these reforms disproportionately harmed the agricultural sector that employed the majority of Syrians. Second, these reforms cut social services in the overcrowded cities that were stretched thin by the influx of Iraqi refugees after the U.S. invasion in 2003, which also saw an increased migration from the agricultural areas when a severe drought hit the agriculture areas in 2006. Third, these reforms produced discordance in the power structure by changing the beneficiaries from the old Ba'athist guard to new Alawite crony-capitalists, which resulted in seething resentments. This research shows that the new elite competition along with the authoritarian nature of the regime prevented an appropriate response to the crisis, eventually leading to violence. This study is divided into four chapters using the comparative analysis and case study format. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II first examines the Syrian political economy under Hafez al-Assad's Ba'athist regime. Chapter II then analyzes how the Syrian political economy was affected by globalization and economic liberalization policies enacted upon Bashar al-Assad's rise to power. This chapter focuses on the macroeconomic picture. Chapter III is a microeconomic analysis of economic reforms from 2000 to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. This chapter discusses the Syrian regime's insufficient response to the most recent drought, the disproporti