Author Description

Military historians have thoroughly documented the longstanding debate between American airmen and ground forces over Close Air Support (CAS). Discord between services, particularly during inter-war periods, has repeatedly resulted in poor CAS preparation and therefore poor performance in the early stages of America's conflicts. Measuring this CAS relationship both before and through conflict in terms of doctrine, training, and personal relationships reveals an additional trend. During World War II, the Korean War, and Operation Enduring Freedom, personal relationships improved and shared objectives emerged as a result of daily interaction between airmen and ground forces. The changes enabled those involved to rebuild the CAS relationship and improve performance in the later years of these conflicts. Regrettably, subsequent declines in the CAS relationship during interwar periods have created a consistent cycle of ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Both services must break this cycle of ebb and flow so that the U.S. military arrives at its next conflict with a properly maintained CAS relationship. CAS performance is inextricably linked to integration, making relationships the essential foundation of combat results. Restoring the CAS relationship can be as simple as airmen and ground forces occupying the same mess tent, in training as well as in combat. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. World War II 3. The Korean War 4. Vietnam and the Gulf War 5. The War in Afghanistan 6. Cross Case Analysis 7. Conclusion From World War I to the present day, American ground forces and airmen have argued over the ideal employment of scarce resources in training, equipment, and sorties. Their debate has often centered on one particularly contentious issue: Close Air Support (CAS). A series of formal agreements and doctrine revisions tells a familiar narrative of begrudging compromise between airmen searching for the most effective use of airpower across a range of mission types and troops w