Author Description

The effectiveness of the German and United States submarine campaigns during World War II is compared by analyzing the genesis of each campaign, the commitment to each and the effort to overcome the losses imposed by submarine warfare. This comparison highlights one aspect of the strategic and operational consequences of conflict with an adversary able to build and maintain a superior industrial base in support of the military effort. This analysis places primary focus on German U-boat efforts in the Battle of the Atlantic and the U.S. submarine efforts in the Western Pacific. Ultimately, the overriding factor in the outcomes of both campaigns was the ability of the United States to produce more ships than the Germans could sink, to build more submarines than the Japanese could sink, and to sink more Japanese ships than the Japanese could build. As a result, the United States was able to sustain its' total military effort against Germany; Japan was not able to sustain its efforts in the Pacific. With the present U.S. requirement for trans-oceanic logistics for force projection, the lessons of WWII should remind us not to downplay the threat of adversarial submarines or to continue to lose the ability to muster a credible shipbuilding industry in the event of mobilization.Before commencing a military operation, War College doctrine advises review of four basic questions. First, what military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal; Second, what sequence of actions is most likely to achieve that condition; Third, how should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions and; finally, what is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of operations. Both Germany and Japan needed to ask these questions as they sought to expand their empires through regional conflicts prior to United States' entry into World War II. Both recognized the criticality of sea lines o