Author Description

Pontiac's War began on 6 May 1763 when a pan-Indian movement attacked several British forts in the Great Lakes region, also known as the pays d'en haut. Pontiac's War emerged following the French defeat in the French and Indian War, as it was known in America. The Ottawa chief Pontiac rallied support from several different Indian tribes to fight in defiance of Major General Jeffrey Amherst's new Indian policies. The Indians' surprise attacks seized eight British forts and placed two others under siege. Amherst responded with enough British forces to maintain a foothold in the pay's d'en haut through the end of 1763. In 1764, the British dispatched Colonel John Bradstreet and Colonel Henry Bouquet into the pay's d'en haut to pacify the hostile Indians and reassert control. The war finally ended when Sir William Johnson, the Indian Superintendent representing George III, negotiated treaties with the major tribes of the pays d'en haut in 1765. This monograph explores Pontiac's War to find elements of operational art in a historical study of a brutal conflict in colonial America. Operational planners will be able to better understand how to apply operational art in future irregular conflicts. The loss of French power in the Great Lakes region was an unsatisfactory end for allied Indians following the French and Indian War. Most tribes in the area had developed long-term relationships with the French settlers and crown through trade, social, political, and military interactions. The settlement that ended the war, the 1763 Peace of Paris, had turned Canada, the Ohio Country, and the existing French forts over to British possession. The British policy towards the Indians resulted in increased tensions with the tribes in the region. Many Indian nations began to see the British presence as a direct threat to Indian sovereignty, which resulted in a tenuous relationship with British rule. These tensions caused the Ottawa chief Pontiac to create a coalition of tribes to rise ag