Author Description

While it appears that the role of the U.S. Army is changing from exclusively fighting and winning the nation?s wars to becoming the force provider for numerous support and stability operations, the potential to become entangled in low intensity close combat has increased dramatically as global instability mounts. The senior leadership of the Army is moving to adopt revolutionary technological advances, which arguably cast doubt on whether future close combat is even necessary. Victory is presumed to be achieved by the massing of combined arms synergy from?stand-off? ranges. However, history is full of examples where the most technologically advanced combatant has lost to the combatant that is the best trained and that possesses the greatest level of cohesion, unity, and espirit de corps. All the advantages mentioned are the by products of tough, realistic maneuver live-fire training at the unit level. The monograph examines the question whether the United States (U.S.) Army?s light infantry maneuver live-fire training is sufficient to warrant a first fight victory. Live-fire training currently mandated by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is identified along with the amount of ammunition allocated to light infantry battalions for such training. Also discussed in depth are the by products of maneuver live-fire training and the leadership training that should provide the Army with intuitive, confident leaders into 2010 and beyond. Finally, discussion will describe current trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center in both force-on-force and maneuver live-fires. The monograph concludes that currently mandated live-fire training and ammunition allocations are adequate for the U.S. Army?s light infantry to be assured a first fight victory. However, recommendations are made on changing Army training methodology which at present is extremely dogmatic and stifles initiative, and hinders the ability to properly fire and maneuver infantrymen and their supporting