Author Description

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 prescribes that services integrate their reserve components into the "total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies." After more than ten years of war, however, there have been no studies that assess the relative capabilities of Regular Army and reserve component units of the same type. Accordingly, the authors of this study employed a stated preference approach to assess the relative importance of component status relative to a number of other potential determinants of operational effectiveness, including but not limited to unit type, training level, experience in country, and associated costs and risk. The authors found that, on the one hand, Regular Army officers consistently said that Regular Army maneuver units were significantly more effective than their Army National Guard (ARNG) counterparts, but that the latter may be employed in low- to moderate-threat environments with acceptable levels of tactical and operational risk. On the other hand, reserve component officers believed ARNG maneuver units perform as effectively as their Regular Army counterparts with additional training and other preparations. Policymakers will need to decide the degree to which they want to rely on the professional judgment of Regular Army or reserve component officers on this point. Preferences with regard to enablers-units employed to support maneuver forces-were considerably less pronounced, as were those with respect to individuals. In the latter category, the dominant factor in determining individual capability was whether the individual in question had a relevant civilian acquired skill.