Author Description

This study investigates the US Army after the end of the Cold War, specifically how the "Victory Disease" resulting from winning the Cold War caused complacency in the US Army which eventually led to the development of a flawed operational concept. This operational concept and its effects on the US Army are examined with respect to recent developments in US Army doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure. The US Army is compared to the Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973 to draw very interesting and close parallels concerning how the victory disease affected the Israeli Army after its victory over the Arab allies in 1967 and how complacency in the post-1967 Israeli Army also led to a flawed operational concept, which, in turn, resulted in vulnerabilities that Israel's enemies were able to capitalize on at the onset of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This study explains how fundamental shifts in how armies prepare for future conflicts can cause vulnerabilities that an enemy can exploit. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your s