Author Description

Philosophical interest in the self has increased in recent years due in part to an interest in consciousness on the one hand and explorations of embodiment on the other. There is, however, little agreement among philosophers as to how to unpack this notion in any detail. This volume draws on recent work from the Anglo-American and continental traditions to provide an introduction to the philosophical problems the notion of the self gives rise to and an overview of the many competing theories of selfhood. The book begins with a discussion of common-sense ideas of the self and what characteristics we consider important for selfhood. The book then moves on to examine notions of the embodied self and if embodiment is required for selfhood, what sort of embodiment is required? Naturalising accounts that seek to reduce the self to the body of the biomedical sciences and reductionist projects in the philosophy of mind that see the brain as a serious candidate for the self are discussed in turn. The elusiveness of the self and the subject's experiences of embodiment are also considered. Further chapters examine the problems of other minds - do we know there are other selves? and how can we know what it is like for others? The notion that the social is an important dimension in constituting the self is also explored. The author concludes that although the self almost certainly cannot bear the weight many philosophers wish to place upon it, it does have value in allowing us to capture certain distinctions like that between persons and selves.