Author Description

With the resurgence of interest in the operational level of war in the United States Army, many operational level terms are in vogue and being studied in great detail. FM100-5 imparts doctrinal wisdom regarding campaign planning, the concepts of center of gravity and culminating point and lines of operation, and AirLand Battle tenets and imperatives -- all great stuff! Many experts have noted that the 1982 and 1986 versions of FM100-5 have put maneuver back into our doctrine, after its having been supposedly subordinated to an attrition-based firepower doctrine since World War II. This monograph is an effort to take a longer look at maneuver -- and specifically maneuver at the operational level. First, a review of doctrinal literature is made to define fully operational maneuver. Secondly, today's ultimate operational maneuver concept -- the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) -- is described in concept and theory, and then traced to its origins not only in Soviet-Russian-Asian history but indirectly to the "strategic raids" by the Confederate and Union cavalry of the American Civil War. Finally, after discovering that most U.S. operational maneuver concepts are essentially identical to Soviet operational maneuver concepts, the paper asks the question whether or not this theoretical concept will work in a modern European scenario -- as executed by the Soviet OMG or a U.S. deep attack force. In essence, operational maneuver is an exciting concept with theoretical support and historical validity. The first real use of continuously successful operational maneuver was probably the "strategic cavalry raid" developed during the American Civil War. Today's OMG (Soviet) and deep attack AirLand Battle force (U.S.) are logical, evolutionary outgrowths of the operational maneuver successes of recent wars. It should therefore not be too surprising to learn that today's operational maneuver doctrine is similar on both sides, having at least partially evolved from a common s