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The United States has a long history in the development of foreign militaries. Over the past eight years, the United States spent an insurmountable amount of time and resources developing the Iraq and Afghanistan Armies. Yet, in 2003, political leaders forgot the obligation of developing genuine strategic objectives, leaving the military without a mission beyond the defeat of its enemies. In World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's forward thinking focused his political and military philosophy on short-term and long-term objectives for the benefit of America's post-war national interests. The United States government implemented the activities to accomplish these goals with the training program in North Africa. Politically, it strengthened an old alliance and ensured the United States role as a global power. Militarily, it enabled the Allied forces to engage the Axis, while America continued to build the world's most powerful army. The training program flourished developing a formidable army that led the Allied advance in Italy. The United States employed the same logic to accomplish strategic objectives for the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations. The United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson determined that continued economic and military aid was the best means to keep the Chinese fighting. Subsequent to the 1942 Central Burma defeat, the War Department ordered the improvement of the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. The intent, strengthen the existing front in the China-Burma-India Theater through the Chinese Nationalist, led by Chaing Kai-shek. Develop a substantial force capable of winning battles that augmented the Pacific Theater by keeping a significant number of Japanese Army Divisions occupied. In 1950, the United States government provided arms and equipment to build a Vietnamese force capable of providing internal security while defending against the spread of communism. In 1954, the United States military assumed responsibility o