Author Description

This paper addresses how strategic effects win and lose wars. Strategic effects are defined here as the impacts that the outcomes from wartime operational and tactical events have on the highest level of decision-makers. Building on concepts proposed by Thomas Schelling, Robert Pape and John Warden, it proposes a model that can be incorporated into the artificial intelligence routines of a computer-based strategic wargame to simulate the goals and will of either or both sides in a conflict. This proposed model is called the value-based strategic effects model (VBSEM). VBSEM essentially provides rules for determining the value of each side in a conflict and then has each side behave according to economic and risk management formulas relative to actual and potential changes in that value. The underlying assumption is each side will ultimately act in its own best interest (as they define their best interest) based on the information available. This paper looks at symmetrical and asymmetrical strategic effects. Finally it offers advice on how VBSEM can be incorporated in a computer-based strategic wargame.