Author Description

My thesis is that given the nature of the threat and strategic environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will likely meet our political objective prior to the termination of conflict; history may provide us with some valuable lessons to consider as we develop and implement a plan for withdrawing forces in the midst of ongoing conflict. The purpose of this paper is to explore a historical case study where military forces were withdrawn in the midst of conflict, and look at possible lessons that might be applied to strategic and operational planning in the future. Understanding and applying these could allow the successful transfer of operations to the host nation without losing ground on our political objective. First, I will examine withdrawal from conflict at the strategic and operational level as it relates to our doctrine. Second, I will look at a historical case study where withdrawal from ongoing conflict was executed in the past. The case study I will look at is the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989. In this study, I will examine the National Policy changes that precipitated the withdrawal, the withdrawal plan and withdrawal execution. Third I will analyze the case study in the context of the elements of strategy and operational art. Finally, I will discuss some recommendations that might be used in the development of a future strategy that that might involve the withdrawal of forces prior to actual conflict termination.