Author Description
The assault on North Africa on 8 November 1942 led to a bitter conflict that finally culminated in the defeat of the Axis forces in Tunisia seven months later. The campaign was, for the U.S. Army, a school in coalition warfare and an introduction to enemy tactics.
Menrva's Summary
THE THESIS
This volume examines the strategic and tactical evolution of the United States Army during the North African campaign of 1942-1943. George F. Howe, writing under the auspices of the Center of Military History, utilizes official records and operational reports to analyze how American forces transitioned from inexperienced participants to effective partners in coalition warfare against Axis powers in Tunisia.
THE SCOPE MAP
What You Will Find
- Detailed operational history of the Allied landings in North Africa
- Analysis of the logistical and command challenges faced by U.S. forces
- Strategic assessment of the transition from initial setbacks to the final defeat of Axis forces
Scope Limits
- Does not provide a comprehensive political history of the Mediterranean theater
- Focuses primarily on U.S. Army operations rather than the broader Allied naval or air force perspectives
THE AUTHORITY PERSPECTIVE
Military historians and scholars regard this work as a foundational, authoritative account of the U.S. Army's early experiences in the European-African theater. Readers frequently note the high level of technical detail and the objective, clinical tone maintained throughout the analysis.
Page Count:
748
Publication Date:
1991-01-01
Publisher:
Center of Military History, U.S. Army
ISBN-10:
0160019117
ISBN-13:
9780160019111
History
World War
United States
Military
Military History
North African Campaign