
This collection brings together a series of connected essays on the nature of human action. Davidson argues for an ontology that includes events along with persons and other objects. Topics discussed include freedom to act; weakness of the will; the logical form of talk about actions, intentions, and causality; the logic of practical reasoning; Hume's theory of the indirect passions; and the nature and limits of decision theory.
This collection investigates the ontological status of human actions and the logical structures governing intention, causality, and practical reasoning. Donald Davidson, a prominent figure in 20th-century analytic philosophy, utilizes his expertise in the philosophy of language and mind to argue that events must be recognized as fundamental entities alongside persons and objects. The text systematically builds a framework for understanding how mental states relate to physical actions, challenging traditional views on the nature of agency and decision-making.
What You Will Find
Experts recognize this work as a foundational text in the philosophy of action, frequently cited for its rigorous analytical approach. Readers often note the high density of the prose, which requires a strong background in formal logic and metaphysics to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
304
Publication Date:
1980-10-02
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0198246374
ISBN-13:
9780198246374
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