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Product Description More complex political institutions produce more stable and socially efficient the outcomes; this book develops an extensive analysis of that relationship. It explores concepts, questions, and insights based on social choice theory, focusing on more than forty democratic countries and severalinternational organizations from late medieval times to the present. Review Political Institutions is an outstanding contribution to the growing literature challenging the conventional wisdom that majoritarian, concentrated-power democracy provides the most 'decisive' and effective government. Instead, as Colomer's logical and emprical analysis convincingly demonstrates, sharing power and dividing power are much more advantageous. A first-rate scholarly achievement! Arend Lijphart, Research Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, San Diego Josep Colomer has produced a rigorous, accesible analysis of social choice in democratic settings. Its empirical scope is broad, its emphasis on institutions is crisp, and its arguments are persuasive. Political Institutions graces OUP's new series on comparative politics. Kenneth A. Shepsle, George Markham Professor of Government, Harvard UniversityJosep M. Colomer's new book is a happy marriage of social choice theory with comparative politics....well worth reading, and including on syllabi. American Political Science ReviewPolitical Institutions should become a staple of reading lists on positive political theory and comparative politics. American Political Science Review About the Author Josep H. Colomer, Professor of Political Science and Economics at the Higher Council of Scientific Research and the Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona
This book investigates the relationship between the complexity of political institutions and the stability and efficiency of their social outcomes. Josep H. Colomer, a professor of political science and economics, utilizes social choice theory to challenge the conventional preference for majoritarian, concentrated-power systems. By examining historical and contemporary data, he argues that systems characterized by shared and divided power produce more effective governance than their centralized counterparts.
What You Will Find
Scholars and reviewers frequently highlight this work as a foundational text for students of positive political theory and comparative politics. Experts note that the prose remains accessible while maintaining the rigorous analytical standards required for academic syllabi.
Page Count:
272
Publication Date:
2001-05-03
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
019924183X
ISBN-13:
9780199241835
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