Author Description

The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is the U.S. Army's single analytical process used to assist the commander and staff in developing estimates and plans for military problem solving. A growing body of research and published works within and outside of the Army community are critical of MDMP as an ineffective means of planning and decision-making. Nonetheless, joint operational planning doctrine has adopted the principles of MDMP as the basis for operational planning and decision-making. This monograph examines a revisionist account of general systems theory (GST) and proposes it as an alternative construct for future military-decision making at the operational level of war. This research rests upon Shimon Naveh's thesis in his In Pursuit of Military Excellence, which asserts that any methodological approach to warfare must be theoretically consistent with the materiel system conditions of warfare. Hence, "in those campaigns where a systemic approach was applied, in both the planning and management of armed forces, the nature of warfare was marked by sound operational logic..." This monograph seeks to answer the primary research question: Is a general systems theory approach to decision-making suitable for the operational level of war? This question is not only of academic interest but also indicative of calls for institutional change resulting from Army and DoD transformation initiatives. A revisionist form of GST, or â€~postmodern-GST, ' is presented as a framework for military-decision making because of its socio-cultural implications and its value as a "potentially progressive and liberating" mode of thinking. The influences of other 20th century theories, namely structuralism, post structuralism, and critical theory are relevant because of their undeniable influence on GST and its revival as a postmodern epistemology. These influences must be examined in order to identify the implications that a priori or uncritically accepted warfare theory has on d