Author Description

During the last 15 years, the United States dealt with the challenges of both developing and reestablishing police forces in numerous post-conflict environments. Although the U.S. Department of Defense would like other U.S. government departments and agencies to lead the effort to reestablish internal police forces, the military will always bear the initial responsibility for security absent a national government and a national police. The experience gained in these recent U.S. stability operations reveal certain principles that are central to establishing a reliable host nation police force. However, these principles were quickly forgotten following each intervention. Planners struggled to rediscover these principles during subsequent stability operations. This paper derives a set of principles that strategic military planners can use as a guide for planning the development of civilian police forces in stability operations. This paper assesses U.S. and international experiences in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to derive the principles for establishing post-conflict national police forces. The research shows that the tasks that consistently confront the planners include assessing the security requirements of the post-conflict environment, determining whether to reform or abolish the existing host nation police force, defining the authority and responsibilities of the police force, and building capacity within the police. These tasks occur sequentially. Although there is a common list of required tasks, each case must be examined individually to reveal the guiding principles and judgments that planners must make when assessing their own unique situation. The data extracted from the case studies of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo suggest four key principles that should be observed while planning the restoration of public order in future post-conflict environments. First, understanding the security situation and assessing it correctly will shape the decision over whether to ref