Author Description

Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen far too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. This book tells why the safeguards designed to prevent bad accounting so often fail. By studying why the auditors and members of a board of directors regularly fail to deliver the truth about a company’s financial state of affairs, this provocative book explores a serious problem in the system of reporting financial information. This book is unique in that it draws together various strands of the literature on corporate governance, accounting, law, cognitive research, psychology, behavioural economics and conventional economics to shed light on questions regarding the feasibility of independence and impartiality of boards of directors and external auditors as monitors and gatekeepers in corporate governance. The book is essential reading for professional accountants and auditors, directors, regulators, law makers, corporate lawyers, and investment bankers. It will appeal to all those interested in behavioural economics and corporate governance.