Author Description
Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent 'actual sequence' theories currently on offer, Sartorio argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other (counterfactual) reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.
Menrva's Summary
THE THESIS
Does the nature of causation provide a sufficient foundation for human free will and moral responsibility? Professor Carolina Sartorio investigates the intersection of causal theory and agency, challenging prevailing 'actual sequence' theories. She posits that freedom is grounded in the actual causes of behavior, arguing that these causes are inherently more complex and sensitive to reasons than traditional accounts suggest, even within a deterministic framework.
THE SCOPE MAP
What You Will Find
- An analysis of the relationship between causal mechanisms and moral responsibility.
- A framework for understanding agent sensitivity to both actual and counterfactual reasons.
- A synthesis of contemporary debates in metaphysics and ethics.
Scope Limits
- The text does not provide a comprehensive history of libertarian or compatibilist theories.
- It does not address theological implications of free will or divine foreknowledge.
THE AUTHORITY PERSPECTIVE
Experts recognize this work as a significant contribution to the philosophy of action, particularly for its novel integration of causal theory into the free will debate. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytic philosophy to fully grasp the nuances of the argument.
Page Count:
196
Publication Date:
2016-01-01
Publisher:
OUP Oxford
ISBN-10:
0191063770
ISBN-13:
9780191063770
Philosophy
Ethics
Determinism
Metaphysics
Free Will
Causation