
People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do. G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.
This book investigates the fundamental nature of reasons explanations for human action and whether they are best understood as causal or teleological processes. G.F. Schueler, a philosopher specializing in action theory, critiques the prevailing Humean model which reduces reasons to mere causal states of belief and desire. He proposes an alternative framework centered on practical deliberation, arguing that human action is inherently purposeful and subject to normative evaluation rather than simple mechanical causation.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Scholars in the field of philosophy of action frequently cite this work as a significant challenge to the standard causalist orthodoxy. Readers often note the rigorous analytical density of the prose, which requires a strong background in contemporary philosophical discourse to fully grasp the author's arguments.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
1900-01-01
ISBN-10:
0191598364
ISBN-13:
9780191598364
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