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Cover -- The Objects Of Credence -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgementsi -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Propositions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Roles That Propositions Play -- 2.2.1 Propositions Are The Objects Of Propositional Attitudes -- 2.2.2 Propositions Are The Contents Of Declarative Utterances -- 2.2.3 Propositions Are Truth-apt -- 2.3 Frege's Account -- 2.4 Russell's Account -- 2.5 Guise Russellianism -- 2.6 Possible World Semantics -- 2.7 Chapter Summary -- 3: The Credence Framework -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Probability Framework -- 3.3 What Are Credences? 3.4 The Credence Framework -- 3.5 Arguments For The Probability Axioms -- 3.6 Other Rules Of Rationality -- 3.7 Chapter Summary -- 4: Credence Claims Are Opaque -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The 'it's Just Obvious' Argument -- 4.3 Choice Behaviour -- 4.4 Omniscience -- 4.5 Conditionalization -- 4.6 Guise Russellianism -- 4.7 A Guise-based Account Of Credence -- 4.8 A Different Guise-based Account Of Credence -- 4.9 Chapter Summary -- 5: Implications For Rationality -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Reflection Principle -- 5.2.1 The Reflection Principle And The Generalized Reflection Principle 5.2.2 The Mug -- 5.2.3 The Improved Generalized Reflection Principle -- 5.2.4 Sleeping Beauty -- 5.2.5 Other Principles Of Deference And Disagreement -- 5.3 The Principal Principle -- 5.3.1 Chance Claims Are Not Extensional -- 5.3.2 The Chance Framework -- 5.3.3 The Principal Principle And The Contingent A Priori -- 5.3.4 Old Problems For The Principal Principle -- 5.3.5 The New New Principle -- 5.4 Chapter Summary -- 6: Practical Implications -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Decision Theory -- 6.3 Decision Theory And The Objects Of Credence -- 6.4 The Two-envelope Paradox 6.4.1 A Specific Version Of The Two-envelope Paradox -- 6.4.2 'm' As A Transparent Designator -- 6.4.3 'm' As A Definite Description -- 6.4.4 Are Rigid Designators Safe To Use As Outcomes In Decision Tables? -- 6.4.5 A Better Restriction -- 6.4.6 Var