Author Description

In an effort to prevent Iraq from sliding further into civil conflict, one of President Bush's most significant initiatives has been to double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in order to expand the reach of the fledgling central government.1 Short of sending a large contingent of forces to secure and run a country, which is impractical considering the simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, PRTs - small, joint civil-military teams - attempt to fill the post-conflict void in the areas of stability, reconstruction, and governance. Given the current administration's emphasis, some observers wonder if the US government considers PRTs to be a panacea for the ethnic and sectarian struggle in Iraq.While most experts agree that PRTs have been somewhat successful in bringing stability to the Afghan provinces, the model has yet to prove itself as an effective long-term vehicle for stabilization and reconstruction.2 Furthermore, by undertaking reconstruction and assistance missions, these teams have incurred the wrath of international aid organizations by infringing upon the "neutrality" they seek to associate with aid and development. Considering the experiences of United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan, this paper offers tactical, operational, and strategic recommendations for optimizing the PRT construct as a tool for stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and future conflicts, while alleviating many of the concerns of international aid agencies working in the same region.In the final analysis, the success of the PRT construct, regardless of how effective it can be made, hinges upon one significant precondition - sufficient security must exist to allow the program to take root. Given success in the area of security, PRTs could prove to be the deciding factor in encouraging reconstruction and facilitating good governance in a post-conflict environment and, ultimately, nurturing the seeds of a stable democr