Author Description
J.S. Mill famously equated physical things with "permanent possibilities of sensation." This view, known as phenomenalism, holds that a rock is a tendency for experiences to occur as they do when people perceive a rock, and similarly for all other physical things. In Phenomenalism, Michael Pelczar develops Mill's theory in detail, defends it against the objections responsible for its current unpopularity, and uses it to shed light on important questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. Identifying physical things with possibilities of sensation establishes a transparent connection between the world of physics and the world of sense, provides an attractive alternative to currently fashionable structuralist and panpsychist metaphysics, offers a fresh perspective on the problem of consciousness, and yields a satisfying theory of perception, all by taking two things notoriously resistant to reduction, chance and experience, and constructing everything else out of them.
Menrva's Summary
THE THESIS
This book investigates whether physical objects can be rigorously defined as permanent possibilities of sensation, thereby grounding the physical world in the fundamental components of chance and experience. Michael Pelczar, a philosopher specializing in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, builds upon the classical phenomenalist framework established by J.S. Mill. By re-evaluating the reductionist potential of sensory experience, the author constructs a systematic argument that challenges contemporary structuralist and panpsychist paradigms. The text utilizes this framework to address persistent problems regarding the nature of perception, the structure of physical reality, and the relationship between consciousness and the external world.
THE SCOPE MAP
What You Will Find
- A detailed reconstruction of the phenomenalist theory of physical objects.
- A systematic defense against historical and contemporary objections to phenomenalism.
- Applications of the theory to current debates in the philosophy of science and mind.
- A reductionist methodology utilizing chance and experience as primary ontological building blocks.
Scope Limits
- The text does not provide an exhaustive historical survey of all 20th-century anti-phenomenalist arguments.
- The work focuses primarily on metaphysical and epistemological implications rather than empirical scientific research.
THE AUTHORITY PERSPECTIVE
Scholars and students of analytic philosophy frequently note the technical rigor and density of Pelczar's prose. The book is recognized as a significant contribution to the revival of phenomenalist thought, offering a structured alternative to dominant metaphysical theories.
Page Count:
224
Publication Date:
2023-02-24
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
019286873X
ISBN-13:
9780192868732
Philosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of
Epistemology