
As an Amazon Associate and affiliate partner, Menrva Books earns from qualifying purchases. Learn more
Examining deterrence theory through a multidisciplinary search for evidence on its validity, this collection of essays explore the conditions under which a strong threat of punishment produces restraint in an adversary, as classic deterrence theory predicts, or else leads to undesired military escalation. Contributors include Richard Ned Lebow, George H. Quester, Paul W. Schroeder, Michael G. Fry, Jack S. Levy, Barry O'Neill, Robert Wilson, John A. C. Conybeare, David B. Yoffie, Jack A. Goldstone, Harold Kelly and Greg Schmidt, and Dean G. Pruitt.
This collection investigates the empirical validity of deterrence theory by examining the conditions under which threats of punishment successfully restrain adversaries versus those that trigger military escalation. Edited by a team of prominent scholars including Paul C. Stern and Robert Jervis, the volume synthesizes perspectives from political science, psychology, and game theory. The contributors evaluate historical case studies and theoretical models to determine whether the classic logic of deterrence holds up under rigorous multidisciplinary scrutiny.
What You Will Find
Experts recognize this volume as a critical academic resource for understanding the complexities of international security and conflict management. Readers frequently note the high level of analytical density and the rigorous, evidence-based approach taken by the contributors to challenge conventional strategic wisdom.
Page Count:
368
Publication Date:
1989-06-29
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0195057635
ISBN-13:
9780195057638
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!