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In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.
This book investigates how depositors' confidence is managed in emerging markets during potential bank runs, particularly when governments face constraints on their ability to provide bailouts. The authors model confidence as a function of the perceived likelihood of future bank bailouts within a rational-expectations framework. They analyze the impact of various bailout policies on depositor confidence in emerging economies where bank liquidity issues emerge sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to rescuing all distressed banks. The core argument suggests that a policy of allowing early bank failures and reserving liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can foster greater confidence than immediate bailouts.
The analysis presented in this work suggests that a strategic approach to bank bailouts, prioritizing later interventions over immediate ones, can more effectively bolster depositor confidence in emerging markets. This conclusion is particularly relevant given the sequential nature of liquidity shortages and the fiscal constraints governments often face. The authors' findings indicate that such a policy, while potentially facing political challenges related to taxation for full bailouts, remains robust even when banks conceal their distress or when early closures trigger contagion effects. The framework provided offers a nuanced perspective on managing financial stability in volatile economic environments.
Page Count:
29
Publication Date:
2004-12-01
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN-10:
1451875681
ISBN-13:
9781451875683
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