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This book investigates the stability of the nuclear deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan during recurring military crises. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, both established scholars in international security and South Asian politics, utilize a comparative case study framework to analyze how nuclear weapons influence the decision-making processes of both nations. They argue that while nuclear weapons have prevented total war, they have simultaneously emboldened both states to engage in limited conventional conflicts and proxy warfare under the nuclear umbrella.
What You Will Find
Experts recognize this work as a foundational text for understanding the nuclear dynamics of the Indian subcontinent. Readers frequently note the academic density of the prose, which provides a rigorous examination of the strategic calculations made by both New Delhi and Islamabad.
Page Count:
0
Publication Date:
2005-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, New Delhi
ISBN-10:
0195665864
ISBN-13:
9780195665864
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