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The Aim Of This Chapter Is To Argue That, For Kant, Reason Is The Faculty Of Systematic Judgment And That Such Judgment Is Deep. My Focus Will Be On Theoretical Reason And Kant's First Critique. I Will Also Discuss The Two Highest Degrees Of Cognition For Kant, Insight And Comprehension, And Argue That Comprehension Is Deep Cognition That Results From Systematic Judgment. In The Next Chapter, I Will Discuss The Principle Of Systematicity From The Perspective Of The Power Of Judgment And The Third Critique. Here, However, I Will Note That In The Introduction To The Critique Of The Power Of Judgment, Kant Makes The Following, Seemingly Strange, Statement. He Writes; The Critique Of Pure Reason...consists Of Three Parts: The Critique Of The Pure Understanding, Of The Pure Power Of Judgment, And Of Pure Reason (ku 5:179). For Kant, The Faculty Of The Understanding Is The Faculty Of Thinking By Means Of Concepts (a69/b94), The Power Of Judgment Is That By Which We Determine Whether Or Not Something Stands Under A Given Rule (or Concept) (a133/b172), And The Faculty Of Reason Is The Faculty Of Making Inferences By Means Of Principles (a130/b169). What, Then, Does It Mean For Kant To Say That The Critique Of Pure Reason Consists Of A Critique Of The Pure Understanding And, Indeed, A Critique Of The Power Of Judgment As Well? Perhaps What Kant Means Is That His Philosophical Project Consists Of A Critique Of The Three Higher Cognitive Faculties, Only One Of Which Is Reason. So, Judgment Should Not Really Be Considered To Be A Part Of The Faculty Of Reason Itself. However, It Is Noteworthy That The Section Of The Introduction To The Third Critique In Which This Passage Appears Is Entitled, On The Critique Of The Power Judgment As A Means For Combining The Two Parts Of Philosophy Into A Whole (ku 5:176). Kant's Point In This Section Is That Because All Three Of The Higher Cognitive Faculties Have A Priori Principles-and Hence Have A Part That Is Rational--the Power Of Judgmen