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Originally Written For A Conference Of The Federal Reserve, Gary Gorton's The Panic Of 2007 Garnered Enormous Attention And Is Considered By Many To Be The Most Convincing Take On The Recent Economic Meltdown. Now, In Slapped By The Invisible Hand, Gorton Builds Upon This Seminal Work, Explaining How The Securitized-banking System, The Nexus Of Financial Markets And Instruments Unknown To Most People, Stands At The Heart Of The Financial Crisis. Gorton Shows That The Panic Of 2007 Was Not So Different From The Panics Of 1907 Or Of 1893, Except That, In 2007, Most People Had Never Heard Of The Markets That Were Involved, Didn't Know How They Worked, Or What Their Purposes Were. Terms Like Subprime Mortgage, Asset-backed Commercial Paper Conduit, Structured Investment Vehicle, Credit Derivative, Securitization, Or Repo Market Were Meaningless. In This Superb Volume, Gorton Makes All Of This Crystal Clear. He Shows That The Securitized Banking System Is, In Fact, A Real Banking System, Allowing Institutional Investors And Firms To Make Enormous, Short-term Deposits. But As Any Banking System, It Was Vulnerable To A Panic. Indeed The Events Starting In August 2007 Can Best Be Understood Not As A Retail Panic Involving Individuals, But As A Wholesale Panic Involving Institutions, Where Large Financial Firms Ran On Other Financial Firms, Making The System Insolvent. An Authority On Banking Panics, Gorton Is The Ideal Person To Explain The Financial Calamity Of 2007. Indeed, As The Crisis Unfolded, He Was Working Inside An Institution That Played A Central Role In The Collapse. Thus, This Book Presents The Unparalleled And Invaluable Perspective Of A Top Scholar Who Was Also A Key Insider.
This book investigates the core question of why the 2007 financial crisis occurred and how the modern securitized banking system functions as a vulnerable, wholesale banking structure. Gary B. Gorton, a scholar and former insider at a central financial institution, utilizes his expertise in historical banking panics to analyze the collapse. He argues that the 2007 crisis was a classic bank run, albeit one involving institutional investors rather than retail depositors, and provides a framework for understanding the complex instruments that triggered the meltdown. By comparing the 2007 event to historical panics from 1907 and 1893, he demonstrates that the mechanics of financial instability remain consistent despite the evolution of market instruments.
What You Will Find
Experts and economists recognize this work as a foundational text for understanding the structural causes of the 2007 financial collapse. Readers frequently note the technical density of the prose, which effectively demystifies complex financial instruments for those seeking a rigorous academic analysis.
Page Count:
240
Publication Date:
2010-01-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0199742111
ISBN-13:
9780199742110
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