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Military organizations have to change with the times. But organizations, of course, resist change; military organizations resist change more than most; and, it can be argued, Russian military organizations resist change more than most military organizations. This is clear from the pace of the post-Cold War attempts to reform the Russian ground forces. Historically, this was an army that, in many ways, sacrificed the need for military efficiency in order to perform a role as the inculcator of Soviet values into young conscripts. Social engineering then mattered almost more than military skill. But today, in the era of high-tech weaponry and expeditionary warfare, armies all across the world can no longer remain simply as 2-year repositories for unmotivated conscript soldiers. Thus it has long been recognized in Moscow's political circles that the "citizen-army" must be replaced by modern, flexible, and well-trained ground forces. The Russian leadership believes that such forces would better protect the country and serve the government as an adjunct to its foreign and security policy. Indeed, it is the likes of President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev who have been the main instigators of reform-wanting their armed forces to be more capable operationally. The politicians have been facing the resistance of conservative generals, and for several years there has been stalemate in the reform process. However, the war with Georgia in 2008 showed the overall weaknesses of the Russian military, and thus undermined the opposition of the generals. Significant change could now come. The Russian ground forces are therefore now undergoing quite significant reform in terms of structure, deployability, and overall philosophy. U.S. military planners must be mindful that, if all that is anticipated comes to pass, these Russian ground forces are now set to shake off many of their old Soviet failings and deficiencies.