This book investigates the complex geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors that precipitated the October War in Israel. The papers, presented at a 1974 colloquium, analyze the period between the Six-Day War in 1967 and the October War of 1973, examining the rising influence of Middle Eastern oil producers, shifts in inter-Arab relations, and evolving domestic and foreign policies. American and Israeli scholars contribute to this analysis, with specific attention paid to American foreign policy, Soviet military doctrine, and the war aims of Arab nations. The introduction offers a retrospective view from December 1974, summarizing the discussions and evaluations of the preceding years.

The collection of papers presented at the Tel Aviv University colloquium offers a detailed examination of the period leading up to the October War. The analysis by American and Israeli scholars covers a broad spectrum of factors, including oil politics, inter-Arab dynamics, and foreign policy shifts. The inclusion of perspectives on American policy and Soviet doctrine provides a comprehensive geopolitical overview. The introduction, written from a post-war vantage point, synthesizes the discussions and evaluations of the years 1967-1973.