
People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do. Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.
How can human actions be explained through reasons without relying solely on causal mechanisms? G. F. Schueler, a philosopher specializing in action theory, challenges the prevailing Humean model that reduces human action to a chain of beliefs and desires acting as causes. He proposes an alternative framework that centers on teleology and normativity, arguing that human agency is defined by the capacity for practical deliberation rather than mere causal necessity.
What You Will Find
Scope Limits
Scholars in the field of philosophy of action frequently cite this work as a significant counterpoint to standard causalist interpretations of human behavior. Readers often note the academic density of the prose, which requires a strong background in analytic philosophy to fully grasp the nuances of the author's argument.
Page Count:
190
Publication Date:
2003-01-01
Publisher:
Clarendon Press
ISBN-10:
0191530530
ISBN-13:
9780191530531
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!