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Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use.
This book investigates why sovereign debt restructurings, contrary to expectations, have largely been swift and litigation-free in the era of bond finance. It presents a model that explains initial creditor fears and explores the reasons for their non-materialization, proposing that a sufficiently attractive exchange offer can lead to full creditor participation as an equilibrium outcome. The work highlights legal innovations like minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents as key mechanisms that coordinated creditors and averted litigation. While exit consents can be leveraged to impose significant haircuts, the potential for creditors to coordinate against them can temper overly aggressive applications.
The book offers a theoretical framework to understand the unexpected efficiency of sovereign debt restructurings. Its analysis of legal innovations like exit consents provides insight into mechanisms that have shaped creditor behavior. The work is likely to be of interest to economists, legal scholars, and policymakers involved in international finance and sovereign debt management. The authors' model suggests that coordinated creditor action, both in participation and in opposition to aggressive tactics, is central to the observed outcomes.
Page Count:
28
Publication Date:
2011-11-01
Publisher:
International Monetary Fund
ISBN-10:
146392464X
ISBN-13:
9781463924645
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